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The bidder for municipal contracts has a hard time of it,
unless, as sometimes happens, he owns the town. He has
even fallen under the animadversion of the Supreme
Bids,
Court of the United States, which has held, in a
Mandamus
recent case, that -as mandamus lies to an officer to do
only such ministerial duty as existed when the application
for mandamus was made, it will not lie to compel him
to sign a contract in accordance vith an advertisement for
public work, and a bid therefor, when, before the application,
the work was readvertised, and the same person made a lower
bid, under which he obtained a contract for the work: United
States v. Lamont, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 97. See I Ai. L. REG.
& REv. (N. S.) 899; Ibid., 742, 819, 820, 851; 2 Ai. L.
REG.

& REv. (N. S.) 5.

The Supreme Court of North Carolina has ruled, that
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punitive damages will not be awarded against a railway company, because, by reason of defective equipments,
Carriers
it failed to carry a person to whom it had sold an
Breach of
Contract,
excursion ticket, back to his starting point, when
Damages

the only injuries complained
of are such as result

from inconvenience, delay, and disappointment, and there is
no evidence of bad motives on the part of defendant: Hansley
v. Jamesvzille & W. R. Co.,

20

S. E. Rep. 528; disapproving

Purcellv. R.R., io8 N. C. 414; S. C., 12 S. E. Rep. 954.
Clark, J., dissented.
According to a recent decision of the Supreme Court of
Appeals of West Virginia, when the proper official of a railroad company fails to inform a conductor of a
Election of
Passenger
change in its rules and regulations as to the sale
of tickets and the stoppage of its trains, and the conductor,
acting through want of the necessary information, wrongfully
refuses to carry a passenger to his destination, and ejects him
from the train, the company is liable to the passenger, in an
action on the case, for the damages sustained by reason of the
wrong committed: Sheets v. Ohio River R. R. Co., 20 S. E.
Rep. 56_6."

The statutory right to recover damages for death occasioned
by the negligence of another, has lately been made the subject
of a very curious ruling by the Supreme Court of
Conflict of
to the effect that a statute of MassachuVermont,
Laws,
Death by
setts, making railroad companies liable for death
Wrongful Act

by their wrongful act, in an action
by the executor

of the deceased, in damages not " less " than a certain amount,
to be assessed with reference to the culpability of the company,
and providing that in case the deceased leaves no widow or child
the damages shall go to his next of kin, is a penal statute, and
that therefore an action cannot be brought under that statute
in another state: Adams v. Fitchburg R. R. Co., 30 Atl. Rep.
687.
The question whether a statute giving compensation to the
relatives of the deceased is to be regarded as penal or compensatory, of course depends tipon its wording; but the
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general tendency is to regard it as compensatory, unless
clearly otherwise. If penal, no action lies thereon in another
state; but if compensatory merely, suit can be maintained
thereon in any state where the deceased was domiciled, if the
law of that state is not inconsistent with that of the state
under which the action is brought: Nelson v. Chesapeake &
Ohio R. R., 88 Va. 971 ; Wintuska's Admr. v. Louisville & N.
R. Co., (Ky.), 20 S. W. Rep. 819. The statutes need not be
precisely alike; it is sufficient if they are similar in policy, are
founded on the same principle, and give substantially the same
right of action to redress similar wrongs. It makes no difference that the mode of distribution of the damages recovered
is not the same, if the provisions of the statute under which the
suit is brought can be carried out by the existing legal
machinery of the courts of the forum ; nor does it alter the case
that the limit of recovery is fixed in the one case by statute,
but left in the other to the discretion of the jury: Hanna v.
Grand Trunk Railway Co., 41 Ill. App. i1I6. (In this case
the action was brought under the laws of Canada.) But suit
cannot be brought in a federal court in the state of the
domicile, by any one not authorized to sue by the laws of the
state of the injury, though such person is authorized to sue
by the laws of the former state: Wilson v. Tootle, 55 Fed. Rep.
2 11. When the laws of the two states are radically different,
such a suit cannot be maintained: St. L., Iron Mountain & So.
Ry. Co. v. McCormick, 71 Tex. 66o; S. C., 9 S. W. Rep. 540;
Belt v. Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co., (Tex.), 22 S. W. Rep.
lO62; and when the laws of the state of injury, (in this case
Mexico,) give no right of action, no suit can be maintained in
another state : De Ham v. Mexican Nat. R. R. Co., (Tex.), 2Z
S. W. Rep. 249. There is an instructive article on this
subject, by Gilbert E. Porter, in 35 Cent. L. J. 185.
The Supreme Court of Oregon, in Longshore Printing 6
Pub. Co. v. Howell, 38 Pac. Rep. 547, while asserting that
conspiracy, when persons conspire to injure or destroy
Injunction
another's business or property, and it clearly
appears that the injury is threatened and imminent, and will
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be irreparable, an injunction will lie to restrain the conspirators, refused to grant an injunction on allegations made by the
plaintiff that the members of the defendant trades union conspire.I to compel him to submit to the union's dictation, upon
pain of being boycotted in business; that the executive committee of the union entered the plaintiff's premises without
license, and ordered his employes to strike, and that subsequently the union ordered another strike, both of which
orders were obeyed; that the defendant induced the city council,
by threats of boycott at the polls, to reject plaintiff's bid for
the city printing, although that bid was the lowest made; that
defendant threatened to boycott plaintiff's customers if they
patronized him, on account of which he lost one customer,
and will lose another; and that defendant circulated the fact
of the strikes by posting notices thereof in numerous places,
all to the past injury and future danger of plaintiff's business;
on the ground that these allegations were not sufficiently
definite to justify the issuance of an injunction. This is mere
pandering to the labor unions.
The Supreme Court of the United States has ruled, in State
zf South Carolinav. Wesley, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 230, that when
Constitutional a suit is brought against persons for property
which they claim to hold as custodians of the
Law.
Suits Against state, and the state does not intervene, but
State

expressly refuses to submit its rights to the jurisdiction of the court, it cannot ask the supreme court to review
the refusal of the trial court to dismiss the complaint against
the defendants, on the suggestion of the state that the action
was really against the state, brought without its consent, and
that the court had no jurisdiction.
-The Circuit Court for the Northern District of Illinois, in
U. S. v. Debs, 64 Fed. Rep. 724, has decided, that when
persons have entered into a conspiracy to boycott
"ContemPt certain cars, and for that purpose engaged in a
conspiracy to restrain and hinder interstate commerce in
general, and in futherance of that design, those actively.
engaged used threats, violence, and other unlawful means of
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interference with the operations of the roads, and, instead of
respecting an injunction commanding them to desist, persisted
in their purpose without essential change of conduct, they
were guilty of contempt; and that any improper interference
with the management of a railroad in the hands of receivers is
a contempt of the court's authority in making the order
appointing the receivers, and enjoining interference with their
control of the road.
This is the decision against which Mr. William Draper
Lewis inveighed so strongly in the December number of this
magazine, i Am.. L. REG. & REv., (N. S. 879.) and it may
not be amiss to point out here the fallacy of that writer's
argument. The question of the criminality of the acts of the
strikers had nothing to do with the question of the injunction.
That question was simply whether or not the strikers, as a body,
should be permitted to interfere with the property of the railroads, so as to prevent the carrying on of interstate commerce, wit/ which only the federal courts were concerned.
Those courts had nothing whatever to do, in the shape in*
which the question was brought before them, with the
individual criminal acts of the strikers, whether regarded as
offences against the state laws, or against those of the United
States. The matter was brought before them solely on the
interstate commerce clause of the Constitution, and the act of
Congress passed in furtherance of it, prohibiting all combinations in restraint of interstate commerce. But this act is only
a re-enactment, Pro tanto, of the common law, which prohibits
all contracts in restraint of trade; and a conspiracy is none
the less a contract between the conspirators, because it is not
a commercial transaction. Now, the question of what is
a restraint of trade is one peculiarly for the court, not for the
jury; and it follows, therefore, that it in no sense deprives the
conspirator of a trial by jury, to forbid him to do the acts
which violate the statute, and to punish him if he disobeys the
prohibition. He is punished, not for the act done, but for the
disobedience. This view of tl:e case completely does away
with the objection that such process is a deprivation of the
right of trial by jury.
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Again, it is urged that an injunction must rest upon a claim
of right. This may be more readily conceded, because in this
case the claim of right existed; for it is not essential that the
claim be a valid one. Preposterous as it may seem, the
laboring classes are at present claiming an interest in the
property of their employer, and even, as in the Homestead
strike, a right to take the management of that property wholly
out of his hands, and to control it themselves. The very
ground claimed as an essential of the injunction process is
therefore present; and the employe can be enjoined from so
The fact that he
treating the property of his employer.
damages the property in asserting this claim is a mere incident, and -whatever its effect as to the criminal liability of the
.employe. cannot affect the other question.
According to a recent decision of the Supreme Court of
North Carolina, an agreement for compensation for procuring
the appointment or resignation of a public officer,
is void, as against public policy; and therefore a
mortgage, given to secure the payment of compensation for
procuring the appointment or resignation of such an officer, is
also void, for the same reason: Basket v. lMoss, 20 S. E.
Contract,

Public Policy

Rep. 733-

The Supreme Court of California, has lately held, that,
under their statute, a stockholder may choose any person to
,Corporations, cast his vote, and a by-law providing that no
Proxies

proxy shall be voted by any one not a stock-

holder, is unreasonable and invalid: People's Home Savings
Bank v. Superior Court of City and County of San Francisco,
38 Pac. Rep. 452.
According to the Supreme Court of Missouri, a freight
solicitor in charge of a railway business office is "an officer or
Service,
Agent

agent of such corporation," within the meaning of

a statute providing for service on the corporation

by delivering a copy of the summons and complaint to such
officer or agent: Davis v. Jacksonville South-Eastern Line,
28 S. W. Rep.. 965. See 2 Am. L. REG. & REv. (N. S.) IO.
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In the opinion of the Court of Appeals of Maryland, letters
of administration granted to the second son
Administration,
of a decedent, upon the representation that he
Fraud, Revocation is the only son, should be revoked for fraud,

Decedents' Estates,

although the oldest son may since have filed a renunciation
of his right to the appointment: Lutz v. Malan, 3o Atl. Rep.
645.
It is strange, that some people never seem to consider
a point of law as finally settled, no matter how overwhelming
the weight of authority may be. The Supreme
Easement,
Light
Court of North Carolina has lately been called
upon to decide, that a person who leases rooms in a building
for the purpose of taking photographs, is not entitled to
damages from an adjoining landowner, because the latter
builds so as to shut off the lessee's light on the side of the
leased premises, as there is no easement of light by prescription in the United States : Lindsey v. FirstNat. Bk. of Asheville, 20 S. E. Rep. 620. There is no easement by prescription
in light and air: Knabe v. Levelle, 23 N. Y. Suppl. 818;
Levy v. Samuel, 23 N. Y. Suppl. 825; S. C., 4 Misc. Rep. 48;
Western Granite & Marble Co. v. Knickerbocker, (Cal.), 37 Pac.
Rep. 192 ; nor will such an easement be implied, as to land of
the lessor, by the lease of a building to be used for a purpose
requiring light, such as marble cutting: Keating v. Springer,
146 Ill. 481 ; S. C., 34 N. E. Rep. 805.
The Supreme Court of California, in Lay v. Parsons, 38
Pac. Rep. 447, has ruled, that the provision of the Ballot
Law, requiring a voter to place a cross, marked
Elections,
Ballots
by a stamp, opposite the name of each candidafe
for whom he votes, is mandatory. The same view was taken
in Sego v. Stoddard, (Ind.), 36 N. E. Rep. 204. See i Am.
L. REG. & REv. (N. S.) 748.
The Supreme Court of Michigan has recently held, (i)
That in a convention for the nomination of candidates for
Nominating public offices, the question whether certain deleConventions gates are entitled to vote may be properly submitted to a committee on credentials; and, (2) That in case of a
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tie vote at such a convention, neither the election officers nor
the candidates can determine the result by lot, in the absence
of a statutory provision authorizing such action: Beck v.
Board of Election Commissioners, 61 N. W. Rep. 346.
The Supreme Court of Idaho, in Penrj, v. State, 38 Pac.
Rep. 655, holds, Huston, C. J., dissenting, that though confidential communications between attorney and
Evidence,
client are privileged, and neither can be compelled
Confidential
Communications.

to reveal them, yet if they are overheard by a
third party, either by accident or design, that third person can
be compelled to testify to them.
According to the opinion of the Supreme Court of North
Carolina, in State v. Caldwell, 20 S. E. Rep. 523, when the
deceased, before making his declaration to his phyDying
Declarations sician, tells him that he knows he is going to die,
the fact that the physician tells him that he too thinks he is
going to die, but hopes he will get well, and that another
person has just told him that the physician had hopes for him,
will not render the declarations inadmissible. See I Am. L.
REG. & REV. (N. S.) 813 ; 2 AM. L. REG. & REV. (N. S.) 15.
The question of the validity of gifts causa vnortis comes
very frequently before the courts. Among others, the Supreme
Court of Rhode Island has recently decided, that
(ffts
Causaaortis evidence that, the day before deceased died, after
her daughter had handed her certain books, as requested,
among which was a bank book, she returned them to the
daughter, saying, "Take the books, and keep them; they are
trours forever; " coupled with the evidence of another witness
that deceased told her shortly thereafter that she had given
that daughter all her.property, because she had nursed her
during her sickness, will not establish a donatio causa mors,
in the face of evidence that deceased had always intended to
make a larger provision for another daughter, and several
years before her death had made a will, in which the first
daughter was appointed executrix, and which would be almost
wholly defeated if the gift was allowed to stand; that the
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second daughter had been to see the deceased during her
illness, and had offered to nurse her, which proposition was
declined by the first daughter, who lived in the same house as
her mother; and that deceased was suddenly taken worse, and
died before the second daughter knew that she was seriously
ill : Citizens' Say. Bk. v. Mitchell, 30 Atl. Rep. 626.
The evidence to establish a donatio causa mortis must be
clear and convincing, and inconsistent with any retention of
control or possession by the donor; and therefore, when the
donee of a bank book has included the balance in bank in his
inventory of the decedent's estate, and has otherwise treated
it as a part of that estate, it will be held to be such, and not a
gift: Viegels Estate, 76 Hun, 462; S. C., 3' Abb. N. C. i59;
28 N. Y. Suppl. 95. But a gift of money on deposit in a
bank, effectuated by delivery of the bank book by the donor to
the donee, and its acceptance by the latter, is not invalidated
by the fact that it is accompanied with a direction to the donee
to divide the balance of the money, after the payment of the
donor's doctor's bill and funeral expenses, between himself
and others named by the donor: Loucks v. Johnson, 70 Hun,
565; S. C., 24 N. Y. Suppl. 267. But, though a donatio
causa mortis may be made in trust for a third person, the mere
handing of a certificate of deposit to another for safe keeping,
with a request to see that the decedent's children get the
money in case he dies, is not valid as such : Dunn v. GermanAmcrican Bk., IO9 Mo. 9 o . There is also a marked difference
between the gift of a savings bank book and one of a national
bank. The validity of the former as a donatio causa mortis
depends on the effect of such delivery, according to the rules
of the bank; the delivery of the latter, not affecting the right
of the donor to withdraw the deposit by check, is, as a rule,
ineffectual: Thomas v. Lewis, 89 Va. i ; Jones v. Weakley,
(Ala.), 12 So. Rep. 420. There is a valuable article on this
subject, by James M. Kerr, in 36 Cent. L. J. 354; and a very
full annotation, in 31 AM. L. REG. 68 I.

The maxim, de minimis non curat lex, applies only when
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both the thing itself, and its effects, are of infinitesimal importance. What is apparently more insignificant
Homicide,
Deadly
than a pin? And yet a pin may become of
Weapon
supreme importance, and, as shown by the
Supreme Court of North Carolina, which has been fortunate
enough to have the opportunity to decide this totally new
point in criminal law, not only one, but even two lives, may
depend upon it. In the opinion of that court, the pushing of
a pin down an infant's throat, thereby producing its death, is
killing it by means of a deadly weapon, and if the intention to
so take the child's life is deliberately formed, and carried into
execution, it is murder in the first degree: State v. Norwood,
20 S. E. Rep. 712.
The Supreme Court of California, in Peo. v. Worthington, 38
Pac. Rep. 689, has very wisely ruled, that evidence showing
that the defendant was told by her husband to kill
Hypnotism,
Evidence
the deceased, and that she did so, does not tend to
prove that the defendant was hypnotized, and so render
admissible evidence of the effect of hypnotism on people subject to its influence.
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin has lately held, in Lord v.
American Mut. Ace. Assn., 61 N. W. Rep. 293, that it is for
the jury to determine whether a total loss of three
insurance,
Accident,
fingers and a part of another on the same hand,
Total Loss
destruction of the joint of the thumb, and a cutting
of the hand, is a loss of the hand "causing immediate, continuous, and total disability," within the meaning of that clause
in a policy of accident insurance. This contrasts very strongly
with the indefensible decision of the Supreme Court of New
York, that when the plaintiff's hand was cut off a short
distance above the knuckles, leaving nearly the whole palm,
and part of the second joint of the thumb, which the plaintiff
testified was of considerable use to him, it was not a loss of
4Cone entire hand," within the meaning of an accident policy:
Sneck v. Travellers' Ins. Co. of Harford,30 N. Y. Suppl. 881.
Bradley, J., dissented, as well he might.
The control of the federal government over interstate com-

PROGRESS OF THE LAW.

"merce is one of the most'important questions of the day, and
has of late been almost constantly before the
Interstate
Commerce,
courts. The Supreme Court of the United States,
Insurance,

Marine,
License

Justices Harlan, Brewer and Jackson, dissenting,

has decided that the business of marine insurance,

like other insurance business, is hot commerce, or an instrumentality thereof, but merely an incident, and therefore the
constitutional provision as to interstate commerce does not
prevent a state from prescribing conditions on which a foreign
insurance company may do business in the state, or from
enforcing such conditions : Hooper v. People of State of California, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 207.
Mr. John G. Johnson, of the Philadelphia Bar, has at last
secured a final victory in the Sugar Trust Case; but one that
reflects little credit on the body that awarded it.
The Supreme Court of the United States, in a long
opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Fuller, affirming the decree of the
Circuit Court of Appeals, reported in 6o Fed. Rep. 934, which
in turn affirmed the decision of the Circuit Court, reported in
6o Fed. Rep. 306, has decided, that the agreement by which
the American Sugar Refining Company incorporated with
itself the Philadelphia Refineries, thus securing absolute
control over ninety-eight per cent. of the total out-put of
refined sugar in the United States, with the necessarily incident power to dictate the price of that commodity throughout
the Union, is not within the prohibition of the act of Congress
of.July 2, 1890, (26 Stat. at Large, 209, c. 647), providing
"that every contract, combination in the form of trust, or
otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade and commerce
,among the several states, is illegal, and that persons who shall
monopolize or shall attempt to monopolize, or combine or
-conspire with other persons to monopolize trade and commerce among the several states, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor." The opinion is a remarkable one. In brief, it
amounts to just this, (after one has washed from his eyes the
dust kicked up to blind them, and has taken time to sift the
few grains of wheat from the pages of chaff,) that such a contract is not within the purview of the statute, because it refers
Restraint
of Trade
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primarily to the manufacture of the article in question, and not
to its interchange among the states, and is consequently not
within the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce.
But this conclusion was only arrived at by studiously ignoring
the facts, that the people of the United States, not merely
those of Pennsylvania, have been forced to pay higher prices
for sugar since the contract in question ; and that the direct
result of that contract was to affect interstate commerce, by
precluding all competition in that particular trade. It also
ignores the fact that the parties to the contract were citizens
of different states, and therefore peculiarly within the jurisdiction of the federal government. Suppose one state had undertaken, under its own laws, to set aside such a contract. The
parties would instantly have raised this very objection to the
state jurisdiction, and this same court, which so strenuously
insists that the annulling of such a contract is solely within
the state power, would have been obliged to admit that claim,
or overturn a series of judicial decisions reaching back almost
to the beginning of our national history. It would be
delightful to see the court impaled on the horns of that
dilemma. But it is well-nigh useless to comment further on
this decision, for Mr. Justice Harlan, who is so uniforml
found on the right side of a question as to almost create the
impression of infallibility, dissented from the rest of the court,
in clear, forcible, intelligent language, which bears the strongest
contrast to the inane hedging and futile searching for support,
that characterize the main opinion. It is matter of regret that
his opinion is too long to quote in full. Two paragraphs,
however, are so clear in their presentation of the true
bearings of the case, and the effect of the decision, that they
must be given place:
"Undue restrictions or burdens upon the purchasing of
goods, in the market for sale, to be transported to other states,
cannot be imposed, even by a state, without violating the freedom of commercial intercourse guaranteed by the Constitution.
But if a state within whose limits the business of refining sugar
is exclusively carried on may not constitutionally impose
burdens upon purchases of sugar to be transported to other
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states, how comes it that combinations of corporations or individuals, within the same state, may not be prevented by the
national government from putting unlawful restraints upon the
purchasing of that article to be carriedfrom the state in which
such purchases are made ? If the national power is incompetent to repress state action in restraint of interstate trade as
it may be involved in purchases of refined sugar to be transported from one state to another state, surely it ought to be
deemed sufficient to prevent unlawful restraints attempted to
be imposed by combinations of corporations or individuals
upon those identical purchases ; otherwise, illegal combinations
of corporations or individuals may, so far as national power
and interstate commerce are concerned, do, with impunity,
w hat no state can do ....
" If this [that Congress has power to prohibit such combinations] be not a sound interpretation of the Constitution, it is
easy to perceive that interstate traffic, so far as it involves the
price to be paid for articles necessary to the comfort and wellbeing of the people in all the states, may pass under the absolute control of overshadowing combinations, having financial
resources without limit, and an audacity in the accomplishment of their objects that recognizes none of the restraints of
moral obligations controlling the action of individuals; combinations governed entirely by the law of greed and selfishness-so powerful that no single state is able to overthrow
them and give the required protection to the whole 'country,
and so all-pervading that they threaten the integrity of our
institutions."
There is one other consideration that might have been
urged, and that is this: No one questions to-day the fact that
the Constitution of the United States, in common with all
constitutions, is not a cast-iron frame, adapted only to the
circumstances in which it was moulded, but is elastic, and
capable of being adapted to new conditions as they arise. No
one, also, will question the fact that the framers of the Constitution, had they foreseen the occurrence of a contingency
like the present, would have prepared express means to meet
it. Now, when such means exist by implication, and can be
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adapted to the end with far less of violence than in the case of'
many an actual usurpation of power, what sound reason can
be given for refusing to employ them? The Constitution
never intended that Congressmen should be elected for their
monetary qualifications; that they should purchase re-election
by River and Harbor appropriations; that a convention of
delegates of worse than doubtful antecedents should dictate
to the people the dhoice of a President; or that an actual
minority of the people of the country, by means of an accidental majority of Congressmen, the unjustifiable unseating
of members of the opposite party to increase that majority,
and the violation of every principle of parliamentary law,.
should enact laws to enrich the few at the expense of the
many; and yet all these things have been done, and have been
winked at, if not actually favored, by this same court. It is
enough to say that if this decision stands, and if it is true
that the national government is powerless to protect the people
against such combinations as this, which the states are both
unwilling to assail and powerless to overthrow, then this
government is a failure, and the sooner the social and political
revolution which many far-sighted men can see already darkening the horizon overtakes us, the better.
The court last mentioned holds, with far better reason, that
the courts of a state from which a fugitive from justice is.
Interstate

demanded by rendition proceedings, do not deny

to such person any rights secured to him by the
Constitution and Laws of the United States, by refusing to pass
on the constitutionality of the statute of the deiianding state
under which the indictment against such person is sufficient:.
Pearce v. Texas, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 116.
The Supreme Court of North Carolina, in State v. Hall, 20
S. E. Rep. 729, has laid down the absurdly technical rule,
that when a person is murdered in one state by
Ptugitives
persons in another, shooting across the border,
the criminals, who has never been actually within the territory of the state of the injury since the commission of the
crime, though it was constructively committed there, are not
Rendition
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persons who have fled from justice and been found in-another
state, within the meaning of the Constitution of the United
States, Art. IV, § 2, cl. 2, providing that a person so doing
shall be surrendered on demand of the state from which he
has fled; but graciously acknowledges, that though the
governor cannot surrender such a person without statutory
authority, (sed quare?), the legislature may supply this casus
ornissus, and give him the power. Clark, J., dissented, in a
very forcible opinion, declaring that in his estimation. "a
person who places himself outside the limits of the state, from
thence to commit the crime within the state, and ever afterwards avoids going into said state to avoid arrest, as truly ' flees
from justice' as he who, having committed a crime, flees
from the state subsequently. If an infernal machine sent by
mail or express from a distant state explodes and kills the
receiver, it is murder committed in the latter state. The
sender skulking in another state to avoid arrest is as truly a
fugitive from justice as if he had accompanied the machine to
its destination, and then fled." In reference to the suggestion
that the state legislature might pass a law providing for the
surrender of the criminal in such a case, he makes the following keen criticism: " It is true the Several states might pass
statutes broader than the clause quoted from the federal constitution, but it is also true that some of them might fail to do
so. The federal constitution does not contemplate leaving the
security of so many cities and towns, lying near state
boundaries, dependent upon the inadvertence or unwillingness
of the legislature of a neighboring state to pass an extradition
law more liberal than the federal constitution."
The view of the majority of the court rests upon a fancied
analogy with the case of State v. Mohr, 73 Ala. 503. There
a person, who it was claimed had obtained goods by false pretences from the New York agent of the prosecutor, a resident
of Pennsylvania, the false representations, if any, being made
to the agent, and who had never been in Pennsylvania, was
held not to be a fugitive. There is this noticeable difference
between the cases, that in the latter case there had been no
commission of the crime, constructive or otherwise, in Penn-
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sylvania; which is sufficient reason for the correctness of that
decision. This saving element is wanting in the North Carolina case. As to who is a fugitive, see 2 AM. L. REG. & REV.
(N. S.) 18.
The liquor laws are another subject of continued dispute,
and the decisions are sometimes hopelessly conflicting, both
The
Intoxicating with each other and with common sense.
Liquors,
Supreme Court of Missouri, however, is usually
Social Clubs correct on such questions, and has again proved
itself so by holding that an incorporated club is" not a person,
within the meaning of an act requiring the "person " licensed
to satisfy the court that he is a law-abiding, assessed, taxpaying, male citizen, over twenty-one years of age; and that
when a bona fide social club, with limited membership, admission to which cannot be obtained by persons at pleasure, and
whose property is actually owned in common by its members,
distributes liquors belonging to it among them, it is not an
illegal sale, within the prohibition against sales by persons not
licensed: State v. St. Louis Club, 28 S. W. Rep. 604.
This is the prevailing opinion: Graffv. Evans, 8 o. B. D.
373; Tennessee Club v. Dwyer, iI Lea, (Tenn.), 452; Piedmont Club v. Comm., 87 Va. 540; S. C., 12 S. E. Rep. 963;
State v. Afc aster, 35 S. Car. i ; S. C., 14 S. E. Rep. 290;
Barden v. Montana Club, (Mont.), 25 Pac. Rep. IO2; CoMm.
v. Pomphret, 137 Mass. 564; though some courts have
thought otherwise, and have punished the steward of the
club as an unlicensed seller of liquor: lWartin v. State, 59 Ala.
34; or at least required the club to pay the license tax required
of retailers: Kentucky Club v. Louisville, 92 Ky- 309; Peo. v.
Soule, (Mich), 41 N. W. Rep. 908 ; State v. Boston Club, (La.),
If,
12 So. Rep. 895 ; Nogales Club v. State, 69 Miss. 218.
however, the club is a mere device to evade the provisions of
the license law, the person who dispenses the liquor is, of
course, liable for a violation of that law: Comm. v. Ewig, 145
Mass. 119; S. C., 13 N. E. Rep. 365 ; Comn. v. Tierney, 148
Pa. 552; and any sale by a club to its members, in violation
of a prohibition or local option law, is illegal: State v. Easton
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Social Club, 73 Md. 97; S. C., 20 Atl. Rep. 783; State v.
Lockyear, 95 N. C. 633; State v. Neis, io8 N. C. 787. There
is an excellent article on this question in 14 Crim. L. Mag.
541, and a long, well-considered annotation thereon, in 31
A3i. L. REG. 86i.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey has recently decided, in
Williams v. Merson, 30 Atl. Rep. 619, that when a lease is
one
Landlord and made of the wife's land, by the husband, for
Tenant,
year, with the privilege to the tenant of a further
Parol Lease term of four years, without authority
from her, the
act of the wife in receiving the share of the farm products
reserved by the lease for the first year will not operate by way
of estoppel to create a term for fivc years. Her assent, under
the statute of frauds, must be in writing.
The Supreme Court of Vermont, in Mack v..Dailey, 30 Atl.
Rep. 686, has ruled, (i) That when a lease provides that if the
lessee keeps all its conditions he may purchase
Lease,
Option to the land, the acceptance by the landlord of the
rent after it is due, without objection, waives a
Purchase
breach of the condition as to the time of its payment; and,
(2) That a provision in the lease that the lessee pmay buy the
land "at the option of the parties," means that the lessee
may buy at his own option.
The Supreme Court of North Carolina has recently held,
in accord with the weight of authority, (i) That one who
forms the design to steal, and carries out that
Larceny,
Consentof design, is guilty, though the owner is advised of
Owner
the intended larceny, appoints agents to watch the
thief, and allows him to commit the theft, with a view to
having him punished; (2) That when the agent of the owner
of the property tells a servant to persuade a third person to
steal that property, and he does so, and the property is taken
by such person, the latter is not guilty of larceny, though he
had previously formed the intent to steal it; for (3) Larceny
cannot be committed unless the stolen property be taken
against the will of the owner; and therefore cannot be committed, when the owner, through his agent, consents to the
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taking and asportation, though the consent is given for the
purpose of apprehending the criminal: State v. Adams, 20
S. E. Rep. 722.
It is well settled, that there can be no larceny with the
consent of the owner, even if that consent is given for the sole
purpose of entrapping the person suspected, and the doer of
the act does not know of the existence of the circumstances
which prevent the criminal quality from attaching: Connor v.
Peo., i8 Colo. 373. The same is true in the case of extortion: Peo. v. Gardner,73 Hun, 66.
According to a recent decision of the Supreme Court of
Michigan, when, in an action for libel for publishing a newspaper article, stating that plaintiff was arrested for
Libel,
'Person Meant larceny, and giving the number of his residence,
evidence is given that another person of the same name as
plaintiff was arrested, it does not show, as matter of law, that
.defendant intended in good faith to refer to such other person :
Davisv. Marxhausen, 6i N. W. Rep. 504. See 2 AM. L. REG.
.& REV. (N. S.) 2 1.
In the opinion of the Supreme Court of South Carolina,
a person who solicits orders, by sample, for sewing machines
for a foreign
License Tax, and their parts and attachments,
ilawkersand sewing machine company, which has a store and
stock of goods in the state, from which such
Peddlers
orders are filled, is not a "hawker or peddler," though he
.occasionally sells a sample machine out of his wagon: State
v. Morehead, 20 S. E. Rep. 544.
The Supreme Court of Iowa holds, with good reason, that
the fact that the defendant in an action for malicious prosecumalicious
Prosecution,
Advice of
Attorney

tion consulted an attorney before prosecuting the
plaintiff for opening his mail, is not admissible as

proof of probable cause, when it also appears that
the attorney gave defendant no advice, but referred him to the
United States officers: Holden v. Merritt, 61 N. W. Rep. 390.
There is an annotation on this subject in i Am. L. REG. &
REV. (N. S.) 591.
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The Supreme Court of Mississippi has recently decided,
that when a note made in another state by a married woman is
Married Women, sued on in Mississippi, the liability of her sepaSeparate Estate, rate estate therefor will be determined by the
laws of the latter state; and will be held to
Liability
charge her separate estate there, though it could not do so
under the laws of the place of contract: Read v. Brewer, I6
So. Rep. 350.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland, in City & Suburban Ry.
Co. v. Moores, 3o At. Rep. 643, has reasserted some of the
familiar principles of the law concerning the
and Servant, liability of an employer for the act of an indeIndependent pendent contractor; holding, that though a person
Contractor

who owes a duty to the public in the execution
of any work, cannot relieve himself from liability for a breach
of that duty by committing the work to an independent contractor, yet neither (I) A railway company, which permits an
engine to be run on its tracks by a contractor in performing
his contract with third parties, nor (2) A turnpike company,
which lawfully permits an independent contractor to operate
an engine over railway tracks laid on the pike, in performing
his contract with the company, is liable for an injury caused
by the negligent operation of the engine.
As a general rule, the employer will not be liable for the
negligence of an independent contractor, if he has selected
one who is competent, and the work to be done is safe, when
ordinary care is used : Engle v. Eureka Club, (N. Y.), 32 N.
E. Rep. 1052. (r) But the contractor must be independent,
that is, left to use his own discretion as to the manner of executing the work, and the choice of laborers and agencies; a
mere power of control, however, if not actually exercised, will
not make the master liable for the acts of the contractor:
Nor-walk Gas Light Co. v. Norwalk, 63 Conn. 495 ; S. C., 28
At. Rep. 32. The direction of what shall be done, also, if
not connected with control over the manner and means of
doing it, does not alter the relation: Morgan v. Smith, I59
Mass. 570; S. C., 35 N. E. Rep. ioi. (2) It is not enough
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that the master should not knowingly employ one who is
incompetent; he must exercise due care to select one who is
competent and skilful: Norwalk Gas Light Co. v. Norwalk,
63 Conn. 495; S. C., 28 Atl. Rep. 32. If he employs a
person known to be negligent, or to be in the habit of carrying
on his work in a dangerous manner, he is liable: Brannock v.
Elmore, 114 Mo. 55; S.C., 21 S. W. Rep. 451. (3) If the
work to be done is in its nature dangerous, or injurious to
others, the master cannot relieve himself from liability by
delegating the performance of it to an independent contractor:
Colegrove v. Smith, (Cal.), 36 Pac. Rep. 411; Williams v.
Fresno Canal & Irr. Co., 96 Cal. i4; S. C., 30 Pac. Rep.
961 ; Brennan v. Schreiner,2o N.Y. Suppl. 130; Ketcham v.
Cohn, 22 N. Y. Suppl. 181 ; S. C., 2 Misc. Rep. 427 ; Pyev.
Faxon, 156 Mass. 47 1. Nor can he so delegate the perform-

ance of any duty he owes to the public, or to private individuals, as to escape liability: Carricov. West Va. Cent. & P.
Ry. Co., (W. Va.), i S. E. Rep. 571; Spence v. Schultz,
(Cal.), 37 Pac. 220; Hanover v. Whalcn, 49 Ohio St. 69.
(4) If the work done by an independent contractor is accepted
and used when in an imperfect condition, the owner is liable for
any injury caused by its defects: Donovan v. Oakland &
Berkeley Rapid Transit Co., (Cal.), 36 Pac. Rep. 5 16. There
is a long annotation on this subject, in 31 AM. L. REG. 352.
The Supreme Court of Florida, in Theisen v. AcDavid, 16
So. Rep. 321, has very clearly stated the principle which
MunicipalTht control the right of a municipal .corporation to
Corporations, enact penal ordinances, as follows: (i) That,unless
-Penal
forbidden by the constitution, the legislature can
Ordinances

clothe municipal governments with power to prohibit and punish by ordinance any act made penal by the
state laws, when done within the municipal limits. (2) Such
an ordinance is not invalid, merely because it prescribes the
same penalties as the state law for the commission or omission of the same act. (3) It is no valid objection to such an
ordinance, that the offender may be tried and punished for-the
same act under both the ordinance and the state law. (4) A
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conviction or acquittal by the municipal courts, under such
an ordinance, is no bar to a prosecution under the state law.
(5) Such an ordinance is not invalid, merely because the trial
thereunder is without a jury. (6) Nor is it invalid, because it
excepts from its operation certain business pursuits that are
not excepted from the operation of the state law on the same
subject.
To the same effect is Hunt v. City of Jacksonville, (Fla.),
See I Ahi. L. REG. & REV. (N. S.)
16 So. Rep. 398.
669, 869.
The question of the imputation of contributory negligence
is one of frequent discussion; and presents itself in an unceasof circumstances and relations. The
in- variety
ee
Negligence,
Supreme Cdurt of Georgia, in a very long and
Imputed,
carefully considered opinion, has lately held, in
Parent and
Child

Atlanta & C. Air-Line Ry. Co. v. Gravitt, 20
S. E. Rep. 550, that (I) When a father entrusts his minor
son of tender years to the care and custody of another, that
person becomes the legal representative and agent of the father
in discharging the duty which the law imposes upon the
latter of guarding and shielding the child from injury; and
accordingly, if the child, by reason of the gross negligence of
his custodian, is run over by a passenger train and killed, such
negligent conduct is, in law, imputable to the father himself;
(2) Such a custodian cannot, however, be properly regarded
as also*the representative or agent of the mother of the child,
since, in that state, the father is, by express statute, invested
with the control of his minor children, and the mother is not
accountable for the conduct of the custodian chosen for them
by the father; and (3) In a suit by the mother in her own
right as authorized by special statute, she is not chargeable
with the negligence of the father, merely because of the conjugal relation existing between them. See I Am. L. REG. &
REv. (N. S.) 314, 870; and an annotation in 32 Abi. L.
REG. 763.
According to a recent decision of the Supreme

Court
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of Florida, which follows the general rule on the subject,
Negotiable
Instrument, coupons payable to bearer, attached to a railroad
ctupons,
bond, and representing the semi-annual instalments
Interest

of interest accruing thereupon, are, in legal effect,

promissory notes, and possess all the attributes of negotiable
paper; they may be detached and negotiated separately by
simple delivery, and may be sued on separately from the bond,
after the bond itself has been paid and satisfied, as well as
before; and when once detached and negotiated, they cease to
be mere incidents of the bond, become independent claims, and
carry interest after their maturity : Trustees of Internal IInp.
Fund v. Lewis, i6 So. Rep. 325.
The Supreme Court of Iowa has ruled, that when a person
induces another to sign a paper containing no writing, and
which is to be used merely as a means of identi-

Instrument
Void for

fying the signer, who does not intend to execute

Fraud,
Bona Fide
Holder

a note or contract of any kind, and then fills out
the blanks so as to make the paper a note, the

note will be void, even in the hands of an innocent holder;
and such evidence is sufficient to warrant a finding that the
note was forged: FirstNat. Bk. of Grand Haven v. Zeims,
6i N. W. Rep. 483.

According to the Court of Appeals of Maryland, an agreement between two parties to farm on shares, one of whom is
to expend a certain sum ift the farmingr operaPartnership
tions, does not constitute a partnership, though
one of the parties spoke of it as such: Rose v. Busher, 30 Atl.
Rep. 637-

The Supreme Court of North Carolina is of opinion, that a
defendant in a criminal prosecution, who testifies in his own
behalf and of his own accord, is guilty of perjury
Perjury
Testlmony
if he testifies falsely. He is to be treated the same
of Defendant as any other witness: State v. Hlawkins, 20
S. E.
Rep. 623. To the same effect are JWfurphy v. State, (Tex.),
26 S. W. Rep. 395; Hutcherson v. State, (Tex.), 24 S. W,
Rep. 908.
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Let the photographers beware how they decorate their
windows! The Circuit Court for the District of MassachuPhotographs, setts has lately held, in Corliss v. Walker, 64 Fed.
Reproduction Rep. 280, (1) That it is a breach of contract and
violation of confidence for a photographer to make unauthorized copies of a customer's photograph; and (2) That though
a private individual may enjoin the publication of his portrait,
a public character cannot, in the absence of breach of contract
or violation of confidence in securing the photograph from
which the publication is made; and (3) That one who is
among the foremost inventors of his time is a "public character," within the above rule.
The Supreme Court of Kansas, in Werner v. Graley, 38
Pac. Rep. 482, has ruled that though in an action of replevin
the measure of damages for the wrongful detention
Replevin,
Damages
is ordinarily the interest on the value of the property while wrongfully detained, yet, when the property has a
usable value, the value of its use while so detained is a proper
measure of damages.
The Supreme Court of New York, Fourth Department,.
following the general rule, has recently held, that a manufacturer will be protected in the use of a geogra-

phical name, by which his goods are known to the
public, as against another manufacturer, who uses the same
name to designate a similar article, not for the purpose of
describing the place where the goods are made, but for the
fraudulent purpose of deceiving purchasers: Gebbie v. Stitt, 31
N. Y. Suppl. io2: There is an annotation on this subject in
i AM. L. REG. & REV. (N. S.) 514. See also 2 AM. L. REG.
& REv. (N. S.) 30.
Trade Name

The Court of Appeals of Kentucky has just passed upon a
most important question, under the Kentucky statutes, §1350,
providing that all wage earners shall be paid for
Wages,
Payment
their wages in lawful money. A mining company
in Money
paid its employes once each month, in lawful
money, for the labor of the past month, and at any time
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"during the month, upon their application, issued checks to
them, payable in merchandise at the .company's store. The
amount of checks so issued to each man was deducted from
his wages on every pay day, and he was paid the balance in
cash, but no money was paid for outstanding checks. This
arrangement was held not to be a violation of the statute:
Avent Beattyville Coal Co. v. Comm., 28 S. W. Rep. 502.
This is hardly in accord with the weight of authority. In
Hancock v. Yaden, 121 Ind. 366; S. C., 23 N. E. Rep. 253,
a contract by an employe that he would receive his wages, or
any part thereof, at the option of his employer, in goods from
the latter's store, and expressly waived his right to be paid
according to the statute of that state, was held to be absolutely
void, and could not be pleaded as a bar to an action for the
wages due the employe.

In Stati v. Loomis, (Mo.),

20

S. W.

Rep. 332, the defendant issued to his employe a coupon
check book for $5 in payment of his wages, which stated that
the book was good for merchandise at the defendAnt's store,
when presented by the employe; and it appeared that the
amount of the coupons was deducted from the employe's
wages and charged to him. This was held a violation of
the act. But an order given to the plaintiff, for labor performed, directing another to pay him $i 8o, is not an evidence
of indebtedness for wages, payable "otherwise than in lawful
money of the United States," within the statutory prohibition:
Agee v. Smith, 7 Wash. 471 ; S. C., 35 Pac. Rep. 370.

A statute similar to those in the above cases was held
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in
Godclarles v. Wigeman, 113 Pa. 43 1, why, no one knows, but"
ostensibly on the ground that it was an attempt to prevent
persons sui juis from making their own contracts; the judge
who delivered the opinion,: (one from whom better things
might have been expected,) saying with that tinsel-like
speciousness of epigram that is so often foisted on the world
in place of sound reason, that it was "an insulting attempt to
put the laborer under a legislative tutelage, which is not only
degrading to his manhood, but subversive of his rights a's
a citizen of the United States." But with all the deference
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possible under the circumstances, one may well stop to
inquire whether it is more degrading, to be forced to labor at
wages barely sufficient to keep soul and body together, and
then be compelled to accept goods at exorbitant prices
instead of the needed money, or to be freed from that oppression, when unable to free oneself, even if it be by the exercise
of a little paternalism. Certainly, most men would prefer
to be the slaves of the public, rather than of a private individual
or corporation. But tastes differ.
The Supreme Court of California, on the authority of
.Archer v. AfcDonald, 36 Hun, (N. Y.), 194, has recently
decided, that a warehouseman, under a contract
Warehouseman,
to store property for a certain time for a cerStorage,
Charges for
tain sum, cannot recover for storage where the
Goods Destroyed

property is destroyed, though without negli•gence on his part, before the expiration of the time: Cunningham v. Kenney, 38 Pac. Rep. 645. But when it is the custom of warehousemen to collect charges for storage only
when the goods are ordered out, an accidental burning of
them before they are ordered out will not release the owner
from the payment of storage: Jones v. Chafn, (Ala.), 15 So.
Rep. 143.

